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Abstract—Secrecy issues of free-space optical links realizing
information theoretically secure communications as well as high
transmission rates are discussed. We numerically study secrecy
communication rates of optical wiretap channel based on on-
off keying modulation under typical conditions met in satellite-
ground links. It is shown that under reasonable degraded
conditions on a wiretapper, information theoretically secure
communications should be possible in a much wider distance
range than a range limit of quantum key distribution, enabling
secure optical links between geostationary earth orbit satellites
and ground stations with currently available technologies. We
also provide the upper bounds on the decoding error probability
and the leaked information to estimate a necessary code length
for given required levels of performances. This result ensures
that a reasonable length wiretap channel code for our proposed
scheme must exist.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, free space optical com-
munication, secrecy capacity, finite-length analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Free-space optical (FSO) communication is a promising
technology for high-data-rate wireless networks, such as data
links between satellites and ground stations [1], [2], [3], [4],
ad hoc trunk link not bounded by fiber networks [5], and the
“last mile” link from the fiber backbone to the client premises
[6].
The high directionality of laser beam can make FSO com-
munications more secure than RF ones. However, it has been
shown in [7], [8] that FSO communications can still suffer
from optical tapping risks, especially when the main lobe
of laser beam is considerably wider than the receiver size,
which is the case for optical links between moving terminals,
and also between satellites and ground stations. To establish
the secrecy of confidential data communications, symmetric
key cryptography is often used with a preshared secret key
or a key exchanged via public key cryptosystems. These
crypto-schemes are based on mathematical problems which
are practically impossible to solve using current computer
resources. Its security is often referred to as computational
security.
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Recently, an approach based on physical layer security
attracts much attention as an alternative mechanism. This
is based on an appropriate coding technique designed by
considering physical properties of the channels, i.e., the main
channel between the sender (Alice) and the legitimate re-
ceiver (Bob), and the wiretapper channel from Alice to an
eavesdropper (Eve). This coding is particularly called the
wiretap channel coding [9], [10], and realizes the two functions
at the same time in the physical layer; the reliability for
Bob and the secrecy against Eve. The secrecy ensured by
this paradigm is referred to as information theoretic security
(ITS), which can be everlasting, in the sense that it can be
proved that Eve cannot obtain meaningful information even by
unforeseen mathematical insights or by off-line attacks with
future advanced computers.
Studies so far on physical layer security in wireless channels
and system architecture issues are nicely reviewed in [11].
An information-theoretically secure key exchange protocol
over quasi-static wireless channels was proposed with a near-
optimal LDPC (low density parity check)-based reconciliation
method over a wide range of signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs)
[12]. Physical layer security of FSO communications has been
discussed in [13], proposing a secret key agreement over
fading channels with reciprocity, and clarifying dominating
factors on the secret key rate. In [14], analysis was made on
likely wiretap scenarios and influences to secure FSO commu-
nication performances, in terms of the outage probability of
non-zero secrecy capacity. Mostafa and Lampe studied physi-
cal layer security for indoor visible light communications [15],
and showed that secrecy rates can be increased by utilizing
Eve’s channel state information (CSI) via null-steering, or by
adding artificial noises when Eve’s CSI is not available.
An extreme example of physical layer security has been
already realized in quantum key distribution (QKD) [16], [17],
[18], which has been extensively studied and now becomes
practical in a metropolitan area fiber network [19], [20]. QKD
ensures the unconditional security in the sense that Eve can
have unlimited physical abilities and computational power.
For FSO channels which are basically line-of-sight (LoS)
communications, however, this assumption is sometimes too
much. The LoS condition can naturally relax the assumption
for Eve. In fact, expected key rates of QKD in satellite-to-
ground links are impractically poor if one insists on assuming
that Eve can be everywhere in the universe and can do
anything. Instead, one should exploit more practical schemes
which can attain higher key rate for LoS FSO channels under
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel based on on-off keying (OOK) modulation.
sensible assumptions case by case.
Design theory for wiretap channel coding should hopefully
be able to evaluate the reliability for Bob and the secrecy
against Eve. Practically, the cost constraint at Alice’s side, such
as the power and bandwidth constraint, is an important factor
to be cared. In fact, transmission power should be carefully
regulated so as not to increase wiretap risks. Furthermore,
the performances should eventually be characterized in finite
length coding for practical use. These issues have been partly
dealt with in literatures [21], [22], but insights into unified
theory and numerically expected performances have not been
accumulated sufficiently yet, even in the idealistic setting of
fading free channels.
In this paper, we study the optical wiretap channels with
linear attenuation and background noises based on the on-off
keying (OOK) modulation. From the practical viewpoint, we
impose the power constraint on Alice’s available transmission
power. We numerically study the achievable secrecy rates and
the secrecy capacity as a function of channel attenuation. We
compare them with the secure key rate for QKD to show
how the performance can be increased by compromising the
assumption on Eve. According to the calculation, even if Eve
can obtain 99% as much power as Bob, FSO links with ITS
would be possible between geostationary earth orbit (GEO)
satellites and ground stations with currently available tech-
nologies. A functional meaning of auxiliary random variable
originally introduced by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [10] to establish
the rate region of the general wiretap channel is clarified as a
booster mechanism of the distance limit due to the auxiliary
noises. We then apply a recent theory on the error and secrecy
exponents by some of authors [21] to finite length analysis on
the optical wiretap channels. We show how the code length
to reach the given required levels of reliability and secrecy is
estimated via the finite length analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give
the model and formulate the problems. In Section III, we
present numerical results of an achievability rate (lower bound
to the secrecy capacity) and the structure of optimal parameters
and power regulation. Section IV includes analysis with the
auxiliary random variable used at Alice. Section V describes
the estimation of the necessary code length for the given
required levels of performances via the finite length analysis.
The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. FORMULATION OF THE MODEL
Throughout this paper, we consider a model of optical
wiretap channel with linear attenuation and background noises
based on on-off keying (OOK) modulation as shown in Fig.
1. This model consists of the main channel WB with which
Alice transmits a confidential message to Bob and the wire-
tapper channel WE with which Eve attempts to observe the
confidential message. Bob and Eve receive the OOK signals
by an on-off detector based on photon counting. The main
and wiretapper channels are characterized by two parameters:
the channel transmittances ηy and ηz , and the dark count rates
(DCR) λy [counts/sec] (cps) and λz [cps], respectively. In this
work, we dare to assume that the channels are fading free, in
order to derive potentially achievable performances in good
propagation conditions.
Alice is subject to the constraint with the maximum avail-
able transmission power of P [W], and transmits on- and off-
signals encoding symbols “1” and “0” with probabilities q
and 1 − q, respectively. The on-signal “1” is conveyed by a
laser pulse of width ∆p [s] and an average photon number
nA. The off-signal “0” is conveyed by the vacuum pulse. Bob
and Eve receive the attenuated pulses of the average photon
numbers nB = ηynA and nE = ηznA, respectively. Detector
efficiencies are renormalized into the channel transmittances.
In order to compare the fraction of power received by two
parties, we introduce the relative transmittance ηzy ≡ ηz/ηy .
In the LoS scenario, ηzy ≤ 1 can be valid. The detector time
resolutions for Bob and Eve are finite, and assumed to be the
same, ∆ [s], for simplicity, and to be larger than the laser
pulse width, i.e., ∆ > ∆p. This time resolution actually sets
the maximum limit of repetition rate of optical pulses.
The above channel model should be regarded as a practical
reduction of Poisson channel [23], [24], which assumes an
arbitrary short time resolution ∆→ 0, i.e., an infinite detector
bandwidth, and has been extensively studied in [25], where
the analytical formulas of the secrecy capacity were derived.
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Fig. 2. Channel diagram of wiretap channel.
In the following, we mathematically formulate the model
mentioned above.
A. Power constraint
Alice needs to optimize the input probability q and the
average photon number nA within the maximum available
transmission power P . In this work, we consider an optical
channel at a center frequency f0 = 200 THz (wavelength of
1.5 µm, which is eye safe and commonly used in optical fiber
communications) with a certain bandwidth B [Hz]. The pulsed
laser of Alice is assumed to be Fourier-transform limited, i.e.,
B∆p = 1. The value of B must be larger than the detector
bandwidth ∆−1. For simplicity, an average photon number at
each frequency, n¯(f), of the on-signal pulse is assumed to be
the same value nA within the bandwidth B. Thus the power
per on-signal pulse is
Pp =
∫ ∞
−∞
n¯(f)hfdf '
∫ f0+B/2
f0−B/2
nAhfdf =
nAhf0
∆p
, (1)
where h is Planck’s constant. The total power of the OOK
transmission is then
Ptotal = q
∆p
∆
Pp = q
nAhf0
∆
, (2)
which must be constrained by the maximum available power
P . Thus, we have the following power constraint:
q
nAhf0
∆
≤ P. (3)
B. Channel matrices
The symbols for Alice, Bob, and Eve are defined as x,
y, and z, drawn from the binary random variables X , Y ,
and Z, respectively. The on-off detectors at Bob and Eve
discriminate the signals by the absence or presence of counts
as “0” or “1”. Since the system is assumed to be stationary and
memoryless, the main channel WB illustrated in Fig. 2 can be
fully described by the elementary channel with the channel
matrix given as
WB(1|0) = 1− e−λy∆ ≡ ay,
WB(1|1) = 1− e−(ηynA+λy∆) ≡ by,
and
WB(0|0) = e−λy∆ = 1− ay,
WB(0|1) = e−(ηynA+λy∆) = 1− by,
Note that the DCR λy is understood to include not only the
dark counts of the detector but also the background noises
in the main channel. Similarly, the elements of the channel
matrix of the wiretapper channel WE are given by
WE(1|0) = 1− e−λz∆ ≡ az,
WE(1|1) = 1− e−(ηznA+λz∆) ≡ bz,
WE(0|0) = e−λz∆ = 1− az,
WE(0|1) = e−(ηznA+λz∆) = 1− bz.
C. Channel capacity and secrecy rate
In this subsection, we introduce necessary measures and
formulas to evaluate the performance of our model. In partic-
ular, starting with channel capacity, we provide the formula for
achievable secrecy rate maximized over possible transmission
strategies without the auxiliary random variable V . The se-
crecy capacity is defined as the maximum achievable secrecy
rate optimized also over the auxiliary random variable V in
addition to the input variable X [10], because the additional
randomness with V can be helpful for deceiving Eve especially
when the wiretapper channel WE is not worse than the main
channel WB , and hence can improve the secrecy rate. We will
work on it later in Section IV.
Considering the standard channel coding without Eve, the
maximum achievable rate of reliable transmission is called
channel capacity, and is given by
C = max
PX
I(X;Y ), (4)
where I(X;Y ) is the mutual information between the random
variables X and Y . The maximization is taken over all possible
input probability distribution PX .
In this paper, we extend the above definition slightly so
that not only the input probability q but also the input signal
intensity (the average photon number nA) are simultaneously
optimized under the power constraint (3). Therefore, the
channel WB is not a given fixed matrix but a 2-by-2 matrix
variable through the parameter nA to be optimized. The
channel capacity is then defined as
C ≡ max
q,nA
fB(q, nA), (5)
where
fB(q, nA) ≡h2((1− q)ay + q(1− by))
− (1− q)h2(ay)− qh2(by), (6)
with the binary entropy function defined as
h2(q) ≡ −q log2 q − (1− q) log2(1− q). (7)
In the wiretap channel coding, we concern the asymptoti-
cally maximum achievable secrecy rate of reliable transmis-
sion to Bob while ensuring the ITS against Eve, which is
defined in the form as [9]
RS = max
PX
[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)] . (8)
To have a positive value of RS, the relation I(X;Y ) ≥
I(X;Z) should hold for any X , which means that the main
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Fig. 3. Contour plots of fB(q, nA) as a function of input probability q and average photon number nB = ηynA of the received pulse. (a) The loss-
independent region with α = − log10 ηy = 60 dB. (b) The noise-limited region with α = 90 dB. The red circle and the white painted area in each plot
represent the channel capacity C and the non-allowed region due to the power constraint, respectively. Parameter values: P = 10 mW, λy = 10 kcps, ∆ = 1
ns.
channel WB is better than the wiretapper channel WE re-
gardless of the input strategy. If this is the case, the wiretap
channel is said to be more capable and the above quantity
coincides with the secrecy capacity, which will be mentioned
later in Section IV. In this paper, we deal with general cases,
not necessarily being more capable, by assuming that the
wiretapper channel WE is not worse. It depends on ηy, λy, ηz
and λz whether the wiretap channel is more capable or
less capable. Now the similar extension for the simultaneous
optimization of q and nA is made as
RS ≡ max
q,nA
fBE(q, nA), (9)
where
fBE(q, nA) ≡ fB(q, nA)− fE(q, nA), (10)
and
fE(q, nA) ≡h2((1− q)az + q(1− bz))
− (1− q)h2(az)− qh2(bz). (11)
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS OF CHANNEL CAPACITY AND
SECRECY RATE
It is generally difficult to derive a closed form expression
for the channel capacity (5) and the secrecy rate (9) except for
simple channels such as a binary symmetric channel. Hence,
we carry out the numerical optimization in order to obtain
these quantities. Throughout this section, we adopt a set of
parameters as follows: P = 10 mW, λy = 10 kcps, λz = 1
cps, ∆ = 1 ns, where the value of the time resolution ∆
corresponds to the maximum possible pulse repetition rate of 1
GHz. Note that the above parameters represent the case where
Alice and Bob have the transmitter and the detector which will
be available at the current level of technology, respectively,
whereas Eve may have a much less noisy detector. In this
case, the wiretap channel is not more capable for all possible
values of nA.
A. Channel capacity
In this subsection, we present basic results of the channel
capacity when there is nothing to do with the wiretapper
channel, discuss important features in our model, and prepare
ourselves for the main analysis on the secrecy rate.
Fig. 3 shows contour plots of the mutual information
fB(q, nA) as a function of input probability q and average
photon number nB = ηynA of the received pulse. The
calculations are demonstrated for two typical cases, (a) for a
sufficiently small attenuation α (short distance transmission)
where an attenuation α is defined by α = − log10 ηy , and
(b) for a larger attenuation α (long distance transmission).
From this figure, we can know how the channel capacity and
the optimal q and nB (and hence nA) are determined as the
attenuation α varies. The power constraint translated in terms
of received power at Bob is represented by the left lower region
below the boundary (red solid line), which is referred to as the
allowed region. The channel capacity C, indicated by the red
circle, can be found on this boundary line. The right upper
region is not allowed by the power constraint, referred to as
the non-allowed region.
In Fig. 3(a), the power constraint border (red line) crosses
the plateau of the maximum value of fB(q, nA). As the
attenuation α increases (the amount of the received power ηyP
decreases), the non-allowed region (right-upper area) extends
to the left-lower side. Unless the power constraint border gets
out of the plateau of the maximum of fB(q, nA), the value of
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the channel capacity remains the same value, independent of
α. In this region, Alice’s power is sufficient enough to transmit
the signals such that Bob’s detector can well discriminate
them, not limited by the noises. We refer to the region as
the loss-independent region.
When the power constraint border has once gotten out of the
plateau of the maximum of fB(q, nA) as depicted in Fig. 3(b),
the channel capacity starts to decrease. One can see the optimal
q should also decrease. This means that Alice had better to
send the on-signal less frequently to be able to make the on-
signal as bright as possible under the power constraint so that
Bob’s detector can discriminate it from the noise background
with high SNR. We refer to the region as the noise-limited
region.
Such behaviors can be explicitly seen in Fig. 4, by the
channel capacity C as a function of attenuation α. The optimal
parameters n∗B and q
∗ are shown in Figs. 5 and 6, respectively.
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In the loss-independent region, although n∗B decreases as
α increases, Bob can still have a sufficiently high SNR,
hence the capacity is unchanged. The q∗ is about 0.5. In
the noise-limited region, n∗B stays at a level of around 1
photon/pulse so that the SNR for the received signals is not
further degraded (keeping the distance between the on- and
off-signals in the I-Q constellation diagram the same order as
the noise distribution), while q∗ should decrease as α increases
so that the power constraint is satisfied. The channel capacity
decreases as α increases, according roughly to q∗.
B. Secrecy rate
In this subsection, based on the analysis carried out in the
previous subsection, we move onto the main analysis on the
secrecy rate RS, and discuss the optimal strategy.
Fig. 7 shows contour plots of fBE(q, nA) as a function
of input probability q and average photon number nB of
the received pulse. Contrary to fB(q, nA) shown in Fig.
3, the function fBE(q, nA) sharply decreases at large nB ,
which is intuitively understood that the bright pulse increases
the information leakage against Eve. Moreover, the value of
fBE(q, nA) can be negative, because Bob’s detector is much
more noisy than Eve’s one, and hence the wiretap channel is
not more capable.
Fig. 7(a) is for the loss-independent region. The maximum
of fBE(q, nA) (red circle) is located inside the allowed region.
Unless the power constraint border (red solid line) passes over
this maximum to the left-lower side, the secrecy rate RS can
be realized at this maximum. Thus, the optimal parameters
(q∗, n∗A) satisfy the strict inequality as
q∗
n∗Ahf0
∆
< P, (12)
indicating that Alice should not use the available power fully
but regulate the transmission power properly so as to prevent
the confidential information from leaking against Eve.
Similarly to the channel capacity, the secrecy rate begins
to decrease when the power constraint border line has once
passed over the maximum of fBE(q, nA) as shown in Fig.
7(b). In this region, the secrecy rate is located on this border
such that Alice should use all the available power to retain the
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Fig. 7. Contour plots of fBE(q, nA) as a function of input probability q and average photon number nB of the received pulse and input probability q. (a)
The loss-independent region with α = − log10 ηy = 60 dB. (b) The noise-limited region with α = 90 dB. The red circle and the white painted area denote
the secrecy rate RS and the non-allowed region due to the power constraint, respectively. Parameters: P = 10 mW, ηzy = 0.95, λy = 10 kcps, λz = 1
cps, ∆ = 1 ns.
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necessary SNR. Thus, the optimal parameters (q∗, n∗A) satisfy
the power constraint with holding equality as
q∗
n∗Ahf0
∆
= P. (13)
In Fig. 8, we calculate the secrecy rate RS as a function of
attenuation α taking the above consideration into account. As
indicated in the figure, the secrecy rate decreases as the relative
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Fig. 9. Optimal average photon number n∗A of the input pulse for the
secrecy rate RS in Fig. 8. Since the secrecy rate decreases to 0, the curves
for ηzy = 0.9 and ηzy = 0.99 are shown up to α = 124.4 dB and 107.6
dB, respectively. The solid line denotes the parameter for the case without
Eve (ηzy = 0) which leads to the channel capacity C.
transmittance ηzy gets close to 1 which is the case where Eve
receives the equal amount of power as Bob. Compared to the
channel capacity denoted by the solid line, we can observe
some unique features of the secrecy rate RS in terms of the
dependence on attenuation α. First, in the noise-limited region,
RS decreases rapidly at a certain threshold point. In this figure,
RS for ηzy = 0.9 and ηzy = 0.99 rapidly fall down to 0 at
around α = 124.4 dB and 107.6 dB, respectively. Second,
if the available input power is fully used up in the loss-
independent region, RS rapidly falls down to 0 as α decreases,
equivalently the distance between Alice and Bob gets shorter.
The optimal parameters n∗A, n
∗
B , and q
∗ are depicted in
7Without Eve (η
zy =
0)
ηzy = 0.5
ηzy = 0.9
ηzy = 0.99
124.4 dB
107.6 dB
Attenuation α [dB]
0 40 80 120 160
10−2
1
102
104
106
108
1010
A
ve
.p
ho
to
n
no
.n
∗ B
[p
ho
to
ns
/p
ul
se
]
Fig. 10. Optimal average photon number n∗B of the received pulse for the
secrecy rate RS in Fig. 8.
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Figs. 9 - 11. Interestingly enough, in contrast to the secrecy
rate itself, the behaviors of these parameters seem to be
irrespective to relative transmittance ηzy . Fig. 9 indicates that
n∗A increases as α increases in both the loss-independent and
noise-limited regions, whereas n∗A for the channel capacity
(solid line) stays constant. This means that, for the secrecy
rate, Alice should properly regulate the input power according
to the distance between Alice and Bob. Fig. 10 shows the
average photon number n∗B = ηyn
∗
A of the received pulse.
As seen from the figure, in the loss-independent region, n∗B
is kept unchanged even if the attenuation varies, while this
value slightly decreases but remains at few photons in the
noise-limited region, so that only Bob can discriminate the
received signal from the noises but Eve should not so. In
contrast to the average photon number behaviors, the optimal
input probability q∗ behaves in a way showing no significant
difference between the secrecy rate
and channel capacity, as shown in Fig. 11.
C. Secrecy rate of wiretap channel coding and secure key rate
of QKD
In Fig. 12, we show simultaneously in the same graph the
secrecy rate obtained in the previous subsection and the secure
key rate of QKD schemes. The secrecy rate measures a mes-
sage rate of wiretap channel coding for one-way transmission,
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Fig. 12. Secrecy rate RS and secure key rate of QKD (BB84 [16] protocol).
Parameters for wiretap channel: P = 10 mW, λy = 10 kcps, λz = 1 cps,
∆ = 1 ns. Parameters for QKD: pulse generation rate = 1 GHz, DCR of a
detector = 100 cps.
while the secure key rate of QKD does a rate of key exchange
with quantum channel and an authenticated public (classical)
channel. The two schemes are based on different assumptions
on Eve. Fig. 12 aims at showing how we can increase the
rate and distance of FSO links with ITS by compromising the
assumption on Eve within reasonable practical conditions.
The curve labeled with “decoyed BB84” shows a theoretical
prediction of the secure key rate via BB84 [16] employing the
decoy-pulse method [26]. Here, we assume an ideal linear
attenuation channel and a single photon detector with a repe-
tition rate of 1 GHz and a DCR of 100 cps, which is a typical
DCR for the current QKD systems. This figure indicates that
the secure key rate rapidly falls down at a distance of 40
dB attenuation, which is roughly the best link budget for a
low earth orbit (LEO) to ground distance in optical space
communications [27]. Although quantum relay based on tele-
amplification [28] has been proposed for extending a QKD
distance (see the curve labeled with “tele-amplified BB84”),
the secure key rate is always sacrificed while extending the
transmission distance.
On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 12, the secrecy rate
RS (blue lines) can cover a wider range in which QKD hardly
generates the secure key even for the relative transmittance as
high as ηzy = 0.99 for the case where Eve can obtain 99%
as much power as Bob. Fig. 12 shows FSO links with ITS is
possible even at α = 80 dB which roughly corresponds to the
best link budget for a GEO-ground distance. Consequently,
wiretap channel coding is potentially a promising candidate
for realization of the global scale secure network based on
FSO communications.
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section, we extend the analysis to full optimization of
secrecy rate by introducing the auxiliary random variable V at
Alice, as was formulated by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [10] and study
the secrecy capacity. This scheme requires us to concatenate
an additional channel PX|V to the main channel WB and
the wiretapper channel WE , respectively. We reformulate
the previous tools, present numerical results, and clarify the
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Fig. 13. (a) Channel diagram of the wiretap channel with an auxiliary random
channel PX|V . (b) Channel diagram of the concatenated channels W
+
B ,W
+
E .
functional meaning and quantitative effects of the auxiliary
random variable V .
A. Power constraint and channel matrices
Similarly to the model in Section II, Alice generates the on-
and off-signals corresponding to encoding symbols “1” and
“0” with probabilities q and 1 − q, respectively. Then, Alice
inputs the sequences into the wiretap channel with picking a
symbol and flipping it randomly. Here, the encoding and input
symbols are modeled by the auxiliary random variable V and
the input random variable X , respectively (more formally, the
random variables form a Markov chain V -X-Y Z). Since the
number taken by the elements of the auxiliary random variable
V need not exceed that of the input random variable X [29],
we consider the case where V , X , Y , and Z are all binary,
as illustrated in Fig. 13(a). The auxiliary channel PX|V from
V to X can be modeled by the channel matrix elements with
any constants 0 < a, b < 1 as follows:
PX|V (1|0) = a, PX|V (1|1) = b. (14)
Then, the probability of the input pulse into the wiretap
channel is q+ ≡ (1− q)a+ q(1− b) in each time slot. Thus,
the power constraint of (3) which is imposed on X is rewritten
as
q+
nAhf0
∆
≤ P. (15)
Effectively, we can consider the concatenated channels W+B
from V to Y and W+E from V to Z as shown in Fig. 13(b).
Given the main channel WB and the auxiliary channel PX|V ,
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Fig. 14. Comparison of maxa,b f
+
BE(q, nA, a, b) with fBE(q, nA)
varying the input probability q. Parameters: nB = 3.2×10−3 photons/pulse,
ηzy = 0.95, λy = 10 kcps, λz = 1 cps, ∆ = 1 ns.
the conditional probability of the concatenated channel W+B
can be written as
W+B (y|v) =
∑
x∈{0,1}
WB(y|x)PX|V (x|v). (16)
The channel matrix of W+B is given by
W+B (1|0) = (1− a)ay + aby ≡ a+y , W+B (0|0) = 1− a+y ,
W+B (1|1) = (1− b)ay + bby ≡ b+y , W+B (0|1) = 1− b+y .
Likewise, the channel matrix of the concatenated channel W+E
is given by
W+E (1|0) = (1− a)az + abz ≡ a+z , W+E (0|0) = 1− a+z ,
W+E (1|1) = (1− b)az + bbz ≡ b+z , W+E (0|1) = 1− b+z .
B. Secrecy capacity
With the channel matrices given in the previous subsection,
the secrecy capacity CS is defined and computed as the
simultaneous optimization over q, nA, a, and b:
CS = max
q,nA,a,b
f+BE(q, nA, a, b), (17)
where the function f+BE(q, nA, a, b) is defined to be
f+BE(q, nA, a, b) ≡ f+B (q, nA, a, b)− f+E (q, nA, a, b), (18)
and f+B (q, nA, a, b) and f
+
E (q, nA, a, b) are the mutual infor-
mations:
f+B (q, nA, a, b) ≡h2((1− q)a+y + q(1− b+y ))
− (1− q)h2(a+y )− qh2(b+y ), (19)
f+E (q, nA, a, b) ≡h2((1− q)a+z + q(1− b+z ))
− (1− q)h2(a+z )− qh2(b+z ), (20)
where nA intervenes through ay, by, az, bz .
In Fig. 14, we compare the function maxa,b f+BE(q, nA, a, b)
(solid line) optimized over a and b with fBE(q, nA) (dashed
line) for a wiretap channel which is not more capable. The
figure indicates that maxa,b f+BE(q, nA, a, b) is strictly positive
for any input probability q ∈ {0, 1} whereas fBE(q, nA) be-
comes negative for small q. Moreover, maxa,b f+BE(q, nA, a, b)
is larger than fBE(q, nA) at any input probability q ∈ {0, 1}.
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Fig. 15. (a) Secrecy capacity CS as a function of attenuation α = − log10 ηy . Also shown for comparison are the secrecy rate RS. Parameters: P = 10
mW, λy = 10 kcps, λz = 1 cps, ∆ = 1 ns. (b) Optimal cross-over probabilities PX|V (1|0) = a and PX|V (0|1) = 1− b for ηzy = 0.99.
The extension in the transmission distance which will be
shown later should be attributed to this increase of the value
caused by the auxiliary random variable V .
C. Numerical evaluation
In this subsection, we numerically demonstrate the improve-
ment of transmission distance due to the concatenation of the
auxiliary channel PX|V . In Fig. 15(a), we compare the secrecy
capacity CS (solid lines) based on (17) with the secrecy rate
RS (dashed lines) based on (9) which was investigated in
Sections II and III (see Fig. 8). According to the figure, the
auxiliary random variable V brings about the improvement
of transmission distance in the noise limited region, e.g., for
ηzy = 0.99, the attenuation α at which the secrecy rate
sharply falls is improved by 6 dB, which is equivalent to 40%
extension of the transmission distance. This effect becomes
significant for larger values of the relative transmittance ηzy .
Fig. 15(b) shows the optimal cross-over probabilities
PX|V (1|0) = a and PX|V (0|1) = 1 − b for ηzy = 0.99 in
Fig. 15(a). Here, PX|V (1|0) is the probability of flipping “0”
(off-signal) into “1” (on-signal) and PX|V (0|1) is vice versa.
As seen in Fig. 15(b), PX|V (1|0) is non-zero and increases
drastically in the noise-limited region, whereas PX|V (0|1)
stays 0.
The effect of the auxiliary randomness generated at the
sender on the performance has been investigated especially
in the multiple receivers scenario [30], [31], [15], namely, the
artificial noise is created such that it degrades Eve’s channel
but does not affect the main channel through the use of the
interference effect among the receivers. In contrast to such
studies, Fig. 15(b) reveals that the addition of the random
pulses has a crucial role in the proposed method. In our
case, Eve who may have the less noisy detector than Bob
can be further deceived by the dummy pulses which act as
extra noises, and the performance is enhanced. This means
that the proposed method bears a remarkable resemblance to
the decoy method employed in BB84 [26]. In this method,
Alice varies the average photon number of each signal pulse
randomly among the prescribed levels, thus Eve is prevented
from wiretapping the signal pulses, and the security and the
transmission distance is boosted.
Message bit m Randomness
bit l
Redundant
bit
Code length n
Fig. 16. Conceptual codeword structure of a wiretap channel code.
V. FINITE LENGTH ANALYSIS
A. Formulation
Although the secrecy capacity investigated in the last section
is considered as a reasonable benchmark of the system, it
concerns only the achievable rate in the asymptotic limit
at code length n → ∞ and contains no information about
practical code construction of finite length n. In this section,
in order to estimate required resources for the given levels of
reliability for Bob and secrecy against Eve, we introduce a
stronger characterization showing how fast the decoding error
probability and the leaked information decrease.
As depicted schematically in Fig. 16, a wiretap channel
code consists of three types of bits, i.e., m bits conveying
the confidential information, l bits as the random dummy
information to deceive Eve, and n −m − l redundant bits to
perform error correction. Here, let RB = m/n and RE = l/n
be the coding rate and the randomness rate, respectively.
For such a code, we introduce the measures on the decoding
error probability εBn and the leaked information δ
E
n . Given an
output via the main channel due to message i from the message
set Mn, Bob computes an estimate iˆ of message i with his
decoder. The decoding error probability εBn is measured as
εBn ≡
1
|Mn|
∑
i∈Mn
Pr{i 6= iˆ}, (21)
where |Mn| denotes the number of messages included inMn
and Pr{·} denotes the probability of an event. Also, the leaked
information δEn against Eve is measured as
δEn ≡
1
|Mn|
∑
i∈Mn
D(P (i)n ||pin), (22)
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Fig. 17. Code length dependence of (a) error probability εBn and (b) leaked information δ
E
n . The coding rate is fixed as to be R
∗
B = 0.5RS = 22.1 Mbps
(see Fig. 8). The arrows denote the change of the code length dependence when the randomness rate decreases by 1% from R∗E = 0.641 Gbps.
TABLE I
RATES AND EXPONENTS FOR FIG. 17
RE [Gbps] R∗B +RE [Gbps] Fc(q,RB , RE) Hc(q,RE)
RE = R
∗
E 0.641 0.663 1.59× 10−4 1.59× 10−4
RE = 0.99R
∗
E 0.634 0.656 4.00× 10−4 0.29× 10−4
RE = 1.01R
∗
E 0.647 0.669 0.28× 10−4 3.94× 10−4
where D(P (i)n ||pin) is the Kullback-Leibler distance [29] be-
tween the output probability distribution P (i)n via the wiretap-
per channel due to message i and the target output probability
distribution pin which is generated via the wiretapper channel
due to an arbitrarily prescribed input distribution.
According to the theory of wiretap channel coding [21],
there exists a code with length n attaining the following upper
bounds on the error probability εBn and the leaked information
δEn :
εBn ≤ 2e−nFc(q,RB ,RE), δEn ≤ 2e−nHc(q,RE), (23)
where the exponents Fc(q,RB , RE) and Hc(q,RE) are re-
ferred to as the error exponent and the secrecy exponent
defined as
Fc(q,RB , RE)
≡ sup
r≥0
sup
0≤ρ≤1
[φ(ρ|WB , q, r)− ρ(RB +RE)] , (24)
Hc(q,RE)
≡ sup
r≥0
sup
0<ρ<1
[φ(−ρ|WE , q, r) + ρRE ] , (25)
respectively. It is known that the error exponent Fc(q,RB , RE)
is a monotone strictly positive decreasing in RB + RE <
I(X;Y ) and becomes 0 for RB + RE ≥ I(X;Y ). Con-
versely, the secrecy exponent Hc(q,RE) is a monotone strictly
positive increasing in RE > I(X;Z) and becomes 0 for
RE ≤ I(X;Z).
Here, φ(ρ|WB , q, r) in (24) and φ(−ρ|WE , q, r) in (25)
are functions of the given channels WB ,WE and the input
probability q. For the wiretap channel based on the OOK
considered in this paper, these functions are given as in (26)
and (27) at the top of the next page. The arbitrary constant
r ≥ 0 is optimized so that each exponent be maximized. The
authors of [21] have derived exponents for the wiretap channel
with the auxiliary channel PX|V . In this paper, however, we
only pay attention to the wiretap channel without PX|V for
simplicity.
B. Code length dependence of error probability and leaked
information
For a practical code of finite length n, the coding rate
RB cannot be arbitrarily close to the secrecy capacity (or
secrecy rate), as well as the error probability εBn and the leaked
information δEn cannot be infinitesimally small. In order to
design the practical wiretap channel codes, the coding rate
RB should be compromised to be much lower than the secrecy
capacity, and then the necessary code length n for the required
levels of εBn and δ
E
n should be investigated. This is actually
the motivation to introduce the error exponent Fc(q,RB , RE)
and the secrecy exponent Hc(q,RE) [32], [33], [34]. Although
some previous studies (e.g. [25]) have revealed that the secrecy
capacity can be asymptotically achieved with constructive
codes, the evaluation of both εBn and δ
E
n for finite length codes
has never been investigated to our best knowledge.
In Fig. 17, we show the upper bounds on εBn and δ
E
n based
on (23) choosing the case of the loss-independent region with
α = 70 dB and ηzy = 0.9. We again adopt a set of parameters
as P = 10 mW, λy = 10 kcps, λz = 1 cps, ∆ = 1 ns, which
are the same as in Section III. The secrecy rate RS is 44.2
Mbps and the optimum parameters are n∗A = 1.94 × 107,
q∗ = 0.544 (see Figs. 8, 9, and 11).
We fix the coding rate R∗B = 22.1 Mbps as to be the half
of the secrecy rate RS. The solid line denotes the case of
R∗E = 0.641 Gbps which is set so that Fc(q,R
∗
B , R
∗
E) =
Hc(q,R
∗
E) = 1.59 × 10−4 as shown in table I. As seen in
this figure, both εBn and δ
E
n begin to decrease rapidly over
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n = 104 and reach the standard error-free criterion εBn < 10
−9
and the leaked information criterion δEn < 10
−9 at around
n = 105, which is the reasonable code length compared
with the current technology. In the standard channel coding
without Eve, εBn can be reduced arbitrarily by lowering the
coding rate RB with fixing the code length. However, in the
wiretap channel coding, since RE should be kept larger than
the mutual information I(X;Z) for the secrecy against Eve, it
is not obvious whether there is a code of reasonable length n
which satisfies the required levels of both εBn and δ
E
n . Fig. 17
provides the significant knowledge on this point, namely, even
for the relative transmittance ηzy = 0.9 which corresponds
to the case where Eve can wiretap much power, there is a
practical code with sufficiently small εBn and δ
E
n .
In Fig. 17, the dashed line labeled with “RE = 0.99R∗E”
illustrates the case where RE is set to be 99% of R∗E . As
shown in table I, Fc(q,RB , RE) increases compared to the
case of R∗E because of its monotonicity in RB + RE . This
brings a decrease in εBn as denoted by the arrow in the
figure. On the other hand, Hc(q,RE) decreases because of its
monotonicity in RE and δEn increases. As seen in the figure,
εBn reaches 10
−9 around at n = 7×104, which is shorter than
the case of R∗E . On the other hand, δ
E
n reaches only 10
−1
with this code length. In order to reach δEn < 10
−9, a much
longer code length of n ≥ 9× 105 is required. In contrast to
the above case, the dotted line labeled with “RE = 1.01R∗E”
illustrates the case where RE is set to be 101% of R∗E . In
this case, εBn increases whereas δ
E
n decreases as shown in the
figure.
Intuitive examples of the above discussion are as follows;
in order to relax the implementation cost of codes, one may
wish to change the criteria for the secrecy according to the
level of confidentiality of information. In the opposite case,
more secure codes may be required to establish secure links
leaving the complexity of implementation out of consideration.
The discussion in this subsection provides the quantification
of such an adaptive change of the performances. In other
words, we characterize another clue for controlling the tradeoff
between performance and code length via the upper bounds in
(23), which is more practical than other examples of tradeoff
relation provided in [21], [22].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the performance of physical
layer security of FSO communications based on the OOK
modulation with linear attenuation and background noises,
using the secrecy capacity and the code length dependence
of the error probability and the leaked information as per-
formance metrics. Although we have mainly focused on the
idealistic setting, i.e., without fading, we have numerically
shown that the global scale network with ITS would be
potentially realized by wiretap channel coding with currently
available technologies and there exists a wiretap channel code
of a practical length.
We have numerically investigated the secrecy rates and the
secrecy capacity and clarified its unique features as follows;
(a) unless the transmission power is regulated optimally, these
quantities dramatically drop in the small attenuation region
and (b) transmission distance of our proposed method can be
much longer than that of QKD even when Eve can obtain 99%
as much the fraction of power as Bob. We have also shown
that the transmission distance can be extended by introducing
the auxiliary random variable V at Alice [10] if the wiretap
channel is not more capable. The random additional pulses
resulting from the auxiliary channel PX|V play an essential
role in deceiving Eve when the SNR at Bob is worse, which
implies the similarity to the decoy method employed in QKD.
This physical implication of the effect of the auxiliary random
variable has not been explicitly demonstrated so far.
Further, on the basis of the past theoretical study [21], we
have introduced the error exponent Fc(q,RB , RE) and the
secrecy exponent Hc(q,RE) for our proposed method. We
have provided the characterization of such exponents in terms
of the code length dependence of the error probability εBn
and the leaked information δEn . The code length dependence
of εBn and δ
E
n provides (a) the evaluation of ε
B
n and δ
E
n for
practical codes of finite length and, (b) the necessary code
length to satisfy the required levels of both εBn and δ
E
n . Our
calculation has indicated the existence of a practical code with
the reasonable length and the sufficient performance even for
the case where Eve can obtain 90% as much power as Bob.
There might be many interesting problems left open. We
mention two of them. First, our analysis should be extended to
include the fading effect. The received signal intensity through
a typical FSO channel fluctuates in a time scale of millisecond
12
due to atmospheric scintillation. A straightforward way is to
model this fluctuation by renormalizing the noise variance in a
log-normal fading distribution, which leads to the degradation
of overall performances. A more sophisticated approach is
an adaptive scheme. If the CSI can be estimated by Alice,
the transmission power can be allocated opportunistically to
the instantaneous fading realizations for which Eve obtains a
lower instantaneous SNR than that of Bob. As a result, strictly
positive secrecy rates are achievable even if, on average, Eve
obtains a better SNR than that of Bob [11], [12]. However,
this adaptive scheme requires a fast feedforward mechanism
in the millisecond time scale, and remains a challenge.
Second and the last, multiple colluding eavesdroppers are a
likely risk in an FSO link. One can easily imagine that multiple
drones tap various places in the FSO link, and collude for
getting information. Countermeasures should not be simple,
and be sought from the viewpoint not only of coding schemes
but also of system level solution like monitoring and alarming
functions.
In spite of such a challenging problem to which we should
address in the future, we believe that the potential perfor-
mances of physical layer security of FSO communications
presented in this paper provide insight into a new direction
for secure communications. For example, it is noteworthy that
performances of physical layer security of FSO channels and
QKD are regarded as complementary technologies in the sense
of the tradeoff between security level and usability. Thus, they
will eventually be integrated to realize high capacity optical
communications with ITS and such a combination should
provide the new paradigm of secure communications.
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